Volume 26, Issue 1 (4-2026)
Social Welfare Quarterly 2026, 26(1): 157-186 |
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Hamidi soha Z, vesali S S, Janadleh A, Alizad E. (2026). Institutional Inconsistencies in Women's Welfare Policymaking: An Analysis of Obstacles in the Policy System Against NGOs' Participatio. Social Welfare Quarterly. 26(1), 157-186. doi:10.32598/refahj.26.100.2
URL: http://refahj.uswr.ac.ir/article-1-4468-en.html
URL: http://refahj.uswr.ac.ir/article-1-4468-en.html
Keywords: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), welfare policymaking, women, social participation, institutional dysfunction.
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Extended Abstract
Introduction
Despite the official discourse’s emphasis on participatory governance and the recognized role of civil society in welfare policy, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) remain institutionally marginalized in Iran’s women’s welfare policymaking. This phenomenon, which we term “institutional silence,” reflects deeper systemic dysfunctions and misalignments within the policy regime itself. While previous studies have pointed to external barriers or general obstacles facing civil society, there remains a significant research gap in understanding the internal institutional dysfunctions that systematically hinder NGOs’ effective participation. The main research question guiding this study is: “What are the most important internal institutional obstacles within the policymaking system that limit NGOs’ effective participation in women’s welfare policymaking in Iran, and how do these obstacles operate as hidden patterns?” This study aims to unpack these multilayered barriers using Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The study is grounded in three interconnected bodies of literature: civil society theory (Cohen & Arato, 2016), participatory governance (Verba et al., 1995), and institutionalism (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Evans, 1995). The theoretical framework integrates these perspectives while primarily utilizing Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework (Ostrom, 1990, 2009) as the main analytical lens. The IAD framework allows us to deconstruct formal and informal rules governing actor interactions at multiple levels (constitutional, collective choice, and operational). It also helps analyze institutional constraints by identifying how rules-in-use, transaction costs, and action situations shape civil society engagement. Additionally, we draw on Bourdieu’s field theory to explain how symbolic capital contributes to the marginalization of NGOs within the policymaking field.
Method
This qualitative study employed thematic analysis. Using purposive sampling with specific inclusion criteria—(1) at least 10 years of professional experience in women’s policymaking or NGO management, and (2) knowledge in both fields—15 participants were selected (5 policymakers, 5 scholars, and 5 NGO managers/founders). Semi-structured interviews were conducted between August 2023 and May 2024, lasting 45-180 minutes (average 60 minutes). All interviews were audio-recorded after obtaining informed verbal consent. Thematic analysis was performed in six phases using ATLAS.ti (v7.5), identifying 157 initial codes, 25 sub-themes, and 7 main themes. While thematic analysis identified what barriers exist, Ostrom's IAD framework was used to explain why these barriers persist and how institutional rules shape actor behavior. Ethical principles including confidentiality and informed consent were observed. The research received no external funding.
Findings
The analysis identified seven core thematic categories that form a network of institutional barriers:
(1) Informational dysfunctions: This theme includes statistical manipulation and concealment, weak problem identification, and detachment from social realities. One participant stated: “There is data concealment in government organizations... they are afraid that information might leak and they would have to be accountable.”
(2) Attitudinal and approach dualities: This refers to contradictions between stated values and actual practices, appearance-based judgments, and position-oriented rather than problem-oriented approaches.
(3) Ethical vacuum in the power sphere: This theme encompasses fears of NGO influence, ethnic/religious prejudices, humiliation of NGOs, and individual/factional interest-seeking at the expense of public good.
(4) Managerial incompetence and lack of accountability: This includes preventing NGO growth, government inexperience in social affairs, superficial government performance, indifference of formal institutions, and non-transparent monitoring.
(5) Token participation and unhealthy political interactions: This theme captures instrumental use of NGOs (especially during elections or for international image-building), informal and personalized state-NGO relations, “quasi-public” networks, and male-dominated lobbying that excludes women.
(6) Financial corruption and resource plunder: This refers to resource diversion, exploitation of women's issues for budget absorption without actual benefit to women, and systemic corruption alongside minimal support to NGOs.
(7) Promise-action gap: This includes outdated laws and policies, attractive laws without enforcement mechanisms, stereotypical and ineffective policy proposals (e.g., repeatedly offering sewing machines to women), and contradictory cooperation with NGOs.
These seven themes do not operate in isolation. Our analysis revealed that they form a self-reinforcing vicious cycle: Informational dysfunctions → attitudinal dualities → ethical vacuum → managerial incompetence → token participation → financial corruption → promise-action gap → which in turn reinforces informational dysfunctions.
Discussion
The findings reveal that institutional barriers are deeply embedded in both the formal and informal “rules of the game” governing Iran's women's welfare policymaking. Using Ostrom's IAD framework, we can interpret these findings as follows:
First, informational dysfunctions reflect weak operational rules regarding transparency and accountability, which increase transaction costs for NGOs seeking to participate. Second, the attitudinal dualities and ethical vacuum represent a fundamental misalignment between formal rules (which officially support NGO participation) and informal rules (which reward loyalty and political alignment over competence). Third, managerial incompetence and token participation demonstrate how the absence of clear collective-choice rules enables state actors to use NGOs instrumentally. Fourth, financial corruption and the promise-action gap illustrate how weak monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms allow resource diversion and policy ineffectiveness.
Crucially, these barriers operate as a self-reinforcing vicious cycle. When policies fail due to lack of real-world knowledge, instead of using NGOs as feedback channels to learn and adjust, the system responds by further restricting NGOs. This response weakens the primary bridge between the state and society, making policymakers’ “glass bubble” even thicker and perpetuating the cycle. While having unique historical and cultural-religious roots in Iran, this cycle shares similarities with findings from China (Su et al., 2022; Song, 2024) and Latin America (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006).
Conclusion
In answer to the research question, the most important obstacle is not any single barrier but the system itself—the institutional rules that treat NGO participation as a threat rather than an opportunity. Breaking this vicious cycle requires: (1) institutional redesign to create transparent information-sharing mechanisms, (2) strengthening accountability structures, (3) redefining the state’s role from “controller” to “facilitator,” and (4) establishing independent monitoring bodies with civil society participation. Research limitations include difficulty accessing senior policymakers and the study's focus on Tehran.
Ethical Considerations
Compliance With Ethical Guidelines
This study was approved by the ethics committee of Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. All participants provided informed consent prior to the interviews and were assured of their confidentiality and the right to withdraw at any stage.
Authors’ contributions
ZH: Conceptualization, data collection, formal analysis, writing – original draft. SV: Supervision, methodology, writing – review & editing. AJ: Supervision, theoretical framework, validation. EA: Supervision, validation, writing – review & editing.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency.
Conflicts of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Cohen, J. L., & Arato, A. (2016). Civil society and political theory. In Democracy: A reader (pp. 370-374). Columbia University Press.
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation. Princeton University. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821723
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1pnc1k
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2006). Informal institutions and democracy: Lessons from Latin America. jhu Press. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?id=CeeOkmvJDJoC
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University.
Ostrom, E. (2009). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763
Introduction
Despite the official discourse’s emphasis on participatory governance and the recognized role of civil society in welfare policy, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) remain institutionally marginalized in Iran’s women’s welfare policymaking. This phenomenon, which we term “institutional silence,” reflects deeper systemic dysfunctions and misalignments within the policy regime itself. While previous studies have pointed to external barriers or general obstacles facing civil society, there remains a significant research gap in understanding the internal institutional dysfunctions that systematically hinder NGOs’ effective participation. The main research question guiding this study is: “What are the most important internal institutional obstacles within the policymaking system that limit NGOs’ effective participation in women’s welfare policymaking in Iran, and how do these obstacles operate as hidden patterns?” This study aims to unpack these multilayered barriers using Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The study is grounded in three interconnected bodies of literature: civil society theory (Cohen & Arato, 2016), participatory governance (Verba et al., 1995), and institutionalism (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Evans, 1995). The theoretical framework integrates these perspectives while primarily utilizing Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework (Ostrom, 1990, 2009) as the main analytical lens. The IAD framework allows us to deconstruct formal and informal rules governing actor interactions at multiple levels (constitutional, collective choice, and operational). It also helps analyze institutional constraints by identifying how rules-in-use, transaction costs, and action situations shape civil society engagement. Additionally, we draw on Bourdieu’s field theory to explain how symbolic capital contributes to the marginalization of NGOs within the policymaking field.
Method
This qualitative study employed thematic analysis. Using purposive sampling with specific inclusion criteria—(1) at least 10 years of professional experience in women’s policymaking or NGO management, and (2) knowledge in both fields—15 participants were selected (5 policymakers, 5 scholars, and 5 NGO managers/founders). Semi-structured interviews were conducted between August 2023 and May 2024, lasting 45-180 minutes (average 60 minutes). All interviews were audio-recorded after obtaining informed verbal consent. Thematic analysis was performed in six phases using ATLAS.ti (v7.5), identifying 157 initial codes, 25 sub-themes, and 7 main themes. While thematic analysis identified what barriers exist, Ostrom's IAD framework was used to explain why these barriers persist and how institutional rules shape actor behavior. Ethical principles including confidentiality and informed consent were observed. The research received no external funding.
Findings
The analysis identified seven core thematic categories that form a network of institutional barriers:
(1) Informational dysfunctions: This theme includes statistical manipulation and concealment, weak problem identification, and detachment from social realities. One participant stated: “There is data concealment in government organizations... they are afraid that information might leak and they would have to be accountable.”
(2) Attitudinal and approach dualities: This refers to contradictions between stated values and actual practices, appearance-based judgments, and position-oriented rather than problem-oriented approaches.
(3) Ethical vacuum in the power sphere: This theme encompasses fears of NGO influence, ethnic/religious prejudices, humiliation of NGOs, and individual/factional interest-seeking at the expense of public good.
(4) Managerial incompetence and lack of accountability: This includes preventing NGO growth, government inexperience in social affairs, superficial government performance, indifference of formal institutions, and non-transparent monitoring.
(5) Token participation and unhealthy political interactions: This theme captures instrumental use of NGOs (especially during elections or for international image-building), informal and personalized state-NGO relations, “quasi-public” networks, and male-dominated lobbying that excludes women.
(6) Financial corruption and resource plunder: This refers to resource diversion, exploitation of women's issues for budget absorption without actual benefit to women, and systemic corruption alongside minimal support to NGOs.
(7) Promise-action gap: This includes outdated laws and policies, attractive laws without enforcement mechanisms, stereotypical and ineffective policy proposals (e.g., repeatedly offering sewing machines to women), and contradictory cooperation with NGOs.
These seven themes do not operate in isolation. Our analysis revealed that they form a self-reinforcing vicious cycle: Informational dysfunctions → attitudinal dualities → ethical vacuum → managerial incompetence → token participation → financial corruption → promise-action gap → which in turn reinforces informational dysfunctions.
Discussion
The findings reveal that institutional barriers are deeply embedded in both the formal and informal “rules of the game” governing Iran's women's welfare policymaking. Using Ostrom's IAD framework, we can interpret these findings as follows:
First, informational dysfunctions reflect weak operational rules regarding transparency and accountability, which increase transaction costs for NGOs seeking to participate. Second, the attitudinal dualities and ethical vacuum represent a fundamental misalignment between formal rules (which officially support NGO participation) and informal rules (which reward loyalty and political alignment over competence). Third, managerial incompetence and token participation demonstrate how the absence of clear collective-choice rules enables state actors to use NGOs instrumentally. Fourth, financial corruption and the promise-action gap illustrate how weak monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms allow resource diversion and policy ineffectiveness.
Crucially, these barriers operate as a self-reinforcing vicious cycle. When policies fail due to lack of real-world knowledge, instead of using NGOs as feedback channels to learn and adjust, the system responds by further restricting NGOs. This response weakens the primary bridge between the state and society, making policymakers’ “glass bubble” even thicker and perpetuating the cycle. While having unique historical and cultural-religious roots in Iran, this cycle shares similarities with findings from China (Su et al., 2022; Song, 2024) and Latin America (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006).
Conclusion
In answer to the research question, the most important obstacle is not any single barrier but the system itself—the institutional rules that treat NGO participation as a threat rather than an opportunity. Breaking this vicious cycle requires: (1) institutional redesign to create transparent information-sharing mechanisms, (2) strengthening accountability structures, (3) redefining the state’s role from “controller” to “facilitator,” and (4) establishing independent monitoring bodies with civil society participation. Research limitations include difficulty accessing senior policymakers and the study's focus on Tehran.
Ethical Considerations
Compliance With Ethical Guidelines
This study was approved by the ethics committee of Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. All participants provided informed consent prior to the interviews and were assured of their confidentiality and the right to withdraw at any stage.
Authors’ contributions
ZH: Conceptualization, data collection, formal analysis, writing – original draft. SV: Supervision, methodology, writing – review & editing. AJ: Supervision, theoretical framework, validation. EA: Supervision, validation, writing – review & editing.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency.
Conflicts of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Cohen, J. L., & Arato, A. (2016). Civil society and political theory. In Democracy: A reader (pp. 370-374). Columbia University Press.
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation. Princeton University. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821723
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1pnc1k
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2006). Informal institutions and democracy: Lessons from Latin America. jhu Press. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?id=CeeOkmvJDJoC
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University.
Ostrom, E. (2009). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763
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Received: 2025/05/3 | Accepted: 2026/02/9 | Published: 2026/05/31
Received: 2025/05/3 | Accepted: 2026/02/9 | Published: 2026/05/31
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